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INTERPRETATIVE EQUALITY AS A 
STRUCTURAL IMPERATIVE (OR "PUCKER 
UP AND SETTLE THIS!") 
Gary Lawson* 
To serious students of the Constitution, Chief Justice Mar-
shall's discussion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison' was 
about judicial equality-the power of the courts, co-equal to the 
similar powers of the legislative and executive departments, to 
construe and apply the Constitution in the course of their duties. 
To less serious students of the Constitution, Marbury was about 
judicial supremacy-the supposedly paramount power of courts 
to interpret and apply the Constitution in a fashion that binds 
other legal actors, including the legislative and executive de-
partments and state officials. 
Marbury's recent past, dating roughly from Cooper v. 
Aaron2 in 1958 through the early 1990s, reflected the triumph of 
a judicial supremacist revolution (or coup). Persons who 
doubted judicial supremacy, such as Attorney General Edwin 
Meese,3 were generally treated by the legal intelligentsia as 
something akin to Raelians. Marbury's present, dating roughly 
from the publication by the Federalist Society of a pamphlet on 
the debate over interpretative authority in 19924 to the current 
day, reflects the triumph of the "departmentalist" counterrevolu-
tionaries (or freedom fighters), who maintain that the courts' in-
terpretative powers are no greater than those of other legal ac-
tors. The counterrevolution has enjoyed considerable-and one 
might even say remarkable-success; today, it is difficult to find 
• Professor, Boston University School of Law. I have no one to thank because I 
have not asked anyone for comments. I know what they will say, and I don't want to hear 
it. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
3. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987). 
4. THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE 
DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY (1992). 
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people who will defend judicial supremacy "with anything other 
than hot air or bluster. "5 
I have no talent for prognostication, so I will not venture to 
predict the future direction of this battle. In part, the direction of 
the debate depends on the reasons for its past course. If, for in-
stance, departmentalism has triumphed in recent years because 
of the power of its arguments and the eloquence of its advocates, 
one might expect the departmentalist reading of Marbury to en-
joy a long and healthy life. A truly cynical soul, however, might 
suggest that the legal intelligentsia's acquiescence to departmen-
talism in the past decade had more to do with the combination of 
a Democratic President and a conservative-leaning Supreme 
Court than with the intellectual force of the arguments for de-
partmentalism-in which case Marbury's future is largely in the 
hands of the electoral college. 
In any event, I do not intend here to rehearse the traditional 
constitutional arguments for departmentalism or the traditional 
arguments for a departmentalist reading of Marbury. Those ar-
guments have been made at length by many people, including 
myself.6 Instead, I want to explore some reasons why a rational 
person might design a constitution along departmentalist lines-
in other words, to suggest why the interpretatively correct read-
ing of the Constitution, and the doctrinally correct reading of 
Marbury, might also be a normatively sound institutional 
scheme. I offer this in direct response to the argument advanced 
by Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer that, even if the Constitu-
tion of 1787 is departmentalist as a matter of text, structure, and 
history, modern political actors should nonetheless accept Su-
preme Court pronouncements on the Constitution as authorita-
tive.7 Their case, in brief, is that the settlement function of law, 
and especially of constitutional law, requires a supreme inter-
preter, and because the Supreme Court is the best available can-
didate for that role, legal actors should treat Supreme Court de-
cisions as the final word on constitutional meaning. The 
argument is explicitly normative and accordingly can only be an-
swered by other normative arguments. 
5. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996). 
6. For an accounting of the literature, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CaNST. COMMENT. 455,458 nn.12-13 (2000); 
Lawson & Moore, supra note 5, at 1269 n.4. 
7. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6. 
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I am uncomfortable treading this normative ground for two 
reasons. First, I am dubious about the value of normative legal 
scholarship, even when it comes from such luminaries as Alex-
ander, Schauer, or Lawson.8 Second, Alexander and Schauer's 
particular normative argument for judicial supremacy rests, as it 
must, on the conditions that make the Constitution of 1787 po-
litically authoritative for contemporary actors, and I am not at 
all persuaded that any such conditions exist. It is no small matter 
to explain why the American Constitution of 1787 has any 
greater normative status than does the Alexander-Schauer Con-
stitution of 2000.9 Thus, in order to engage Alexander and 
Schauer on their own terms, I would have to make normative ar-
guments that I do not think can be grounded in an academically 
responsible fashion, based on assumptions about the normative 
status of the Constitution that I do not accept. Accordingly, I 
confine myself to a somewhat more limited point: the normative 
case for a departmentalist constitution has elements that Alex-
ander and Schauer did not adequately address and that persons 
interested in normative questions about the Constitution may 
find interesting. Further the deponent saith not. 
Alexander and Schauer are right about many things. They 
are right that law's settlement function is vitally important. They 
are right that such a function is especially important in constitu-
tional law, where the whole point of a constitution is to lock in 
certain resolutions of contested questions. They are right that, in 
general, such a function is better served by a clear hierarchy of 
interpretative authority than by a system of coordinate inter-
preters. And let us even assume that they are right about some-
thing on which they are actually embarrassingly wrong: that the 
Supreme Court is the best candidate for a supreme interpreter if 
there must be one.10 Grant all of this and the case against de-
partmentalist interpretation still has not been made. 
8. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'Y 727, 778 (1988) ("It is conceivable that the ethical, epistemological, and meta-
physical problems of the ages will be solved by an article in a twentieth-century, English-
language law journal. But I rather doubt it."). I am not substantially more optimistic 
about the likely contributions to moral knowledge from twenty-first century law journals. 
9. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 465. 
10. The best candidate for supreme interpreter is, obviously, me. The second best 
candidate is probably Mike Paulsen, though I suppose that reasonable people could dis-
agree on the proper sequence once we get past me on the list. In any event, there are go-
ing to be quite a few people who are well ahead of the Supreme Court. Of course, I am 
n~t mentioned anywhere in the Constitution as a potential authoritative interpreter, but 
It IS unclear why that is relevant to a preconstitutional argument. 
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Consider the more general case for a regime that divides 
governmental power through separation of powers and bicam-
eralism. Separation of powers, as its critics are quick to point 
out, is very messy.11 The American system of separation of pow-
ers and bicameralism, which provides for the possibility, and 
even likelihood, of divided government, is especially messy. The 
lawmaking process is slow, cumbersome, and difficult. The laws 
that emerge from such a divided regime are likely to lack coher-
ence, and thus likely to lack some of the characteristics that 
make law valuable. The separation of execution from lawmaking 
increases the cumbersomeness, unpredictability, and incoher-
ence of the system: the actual effect of laws will vary enormously 
across space and time with variations in enforcement regimes. 
Throw in a separate judicial body and the problems of predict-
ability and coherence multiply. Separation of powers and bicam-
eralism significantly threaten the settlement function of law. The 
same arguments can be made about federalism. The dispersion 
of authority among distinct governmental actors creates the pos-
sibility of conflicts among jurisdictions and reduces the clarity of 
signals sent by any one jurisdiction to its subjects. Federalism 
significantly threatens the settlement function of law. 
Separation of powers, bicameralism, and federalism are all 
mechanisms for dispersing power that make it more difficult for 
wise lawmakers to produce and enforce a stable, coherent body 
of law and make it more difficult for subjects to conform to the 
commands of their masters. If one was confident that the gov-
ernmental masters were likely to be wise and benevolent rulers 
who would do the right thing a substantial percentage of the 
time, it is hard to imagine why one would ever adopt a regime 
containing these structural features. That may be why many 
countries have not in fact adopted such a regime and why mod-
ern America has effectively abandoned it through adoption of 
administrative mechanisms that mostly dispense with the struc-
tural niceties of the Constitution.12 
But there is nonetheless a powerful normative case for an 
eighteenth-century-American style system of separated powers, 
11. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
633 (2000). 
12. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231 (1994). Modern administrative government emerged from an express rejection 
of eighteenth-century principles of federalism and separated powers. See JAMES LANDIS, 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) (heaping contempt upon strategies for dividing 
governmental power). 
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bicameralism, and federalism. 13 Quite simply, separation of pow-
ers works better than more concentrated systems, whether par-
liamentary or dictatorial, if governments are likely to reach a lot 
of wrong results-whether through corruption, stupidity, disin-
terest, or lack of knowledge.14 Put bluntly, separation of powers 
reduces the amount of damage that any particular bad people 
can do. A really bad American President (and we have had 
plenty) can do a lot of damage- but less than he could if he also 
had all legislative and judicial powers. A really bad Senator (and 
we have had plenty) can do a lot of damage, but less than if all 
power was concentrated in the hands of the Senator or his/her 
cronies. A really bad state (and we have had plenty) can do a lot 
of damage, but less than if its decisions were uniformly imposed 
on a larger region. Separation of powers, federalism, and bicam-
eralism are destabilizing, or un-settling, to the point that they se-
riously threaten some of the core reasons for having law in the 
first place. Maybe they are in fact a bad idea. But maybe they 
aren't. It doesn't take very much risk aversion to think that di-
viding power is, all things considered, likely to work better 
across a broad range of real-world scenarios than concentrating 
it in one authority. 
Interpretative power is a kind of governmental power-a 
very potent and important kind of governmental power. Concen-
trating it in one place furthers some important values that go to 
the very core of law. But it is a very risky strategy. If the su-
preme interpreter is in fact likely to be bad at the job, then one 
must face the costs of imposing bad decisions on a whole coun-
try. The same arguments that justify dividing the power of sub-
stantive lawmaking among different bodies also justify dividing 
the power of interpretation among different bodies. It does not 
take very much risk aversion to justify departmentalism. 
Nor does it take much empiricism. The Supreme Court does 
a generally miserable job of interpreting the Constitution, 
judged by pretty much any plausible standard that one could ad-
vance. That is not to say that presidents, members of Congress, 
13. Steve Calabresi has eloquently (at least for a non-libertarian) defended some 
aspects of American-style separation of powers, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues of 
Presidemial Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the 
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 51 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative 
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995), and federalism, see Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of 
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995). 
14. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE 
RULE OF LAw (1998) (discussing the problems of knowledge, interest, and power). 
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or state officials are any better; we are assuming, remember, that 
the Supreme Court is the best choice among the available candi-
dates for the role of supreme interpreter. That is exactly the 
point. The best choice is still a really bad one. Any choice of su-
preme interpreter (other than me) poses extraordinary risks of 
great harm; just ask any partially-born baby whose brain is about 
to get sucked out.15 Rather than choose a supreme interpreter, 
why not cut your losses by dividing interpretative authority 
across many actors? The price of liberty is eternal vigilance-
and it just might also cost some settlement in the bargain. Even 
if settlement is the sine qua non of law, the bargain might still be 
a good one. After all, law is the handmaiden of liberty, not vice 
versa. 
In sum, the case for dividing interpretative authority is no 
different than the case for dividing legislative authority horizon-
tally or vertically, for separating legislative from executive au-
thority, or for dividing power geographically among distinct 
units. Alexander and Schauer either need to distinguish interpre-
tation from other legal activities or acknowledge that they are 
making a substantially stronger claim about constitutional design 
than they are letting on. 
A focus on the separation-of-powers rationale for depart-
mentalism has important consequences for departmentalists as 
well. First, it means that one needs to think carefully about the 
role of state officials in the constitutional scheme. Alexander and 
Schauer note that many departmentalists balk (as I do not) at 
giving state officials interpretative authority on a par with Su-
preme Court Justices.16 As a textual, structural, and historical 
matter, state officials have the same power of interpretation as 
federal officials; if departmentalists don't talk about the states, it 
is probably for no better reason than that they do not want to be 
associated with a guy named Faubus any more than Alexander 
and Schauer want to be associated with a guy named Taney. On 
a pure normative level, it is true that increasing the number of 
interpreters increases the costs of divided authority. It may well 
be that there is an optimal level of dispersion of interpretative 
authority that is less than the full dispersion that would result 
from the constitutional scheme recognized by Marbury. But for 
Alexander and Schauer, that would be, as it were, haggling over 
the price as long as the optimal degree of dispersion is not zero. 
15. If your stomach can handle it, see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
16. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at 475-76. 
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Linking departmentalism to the more general risk-averting 
case for structural constitutionalism also requires some serious 
thought about precedent. A strong form of precedent concen-
trates power in temporally situated actors. A regime of weak or 
no precedent better disperses power, albeit at a cost in terms of 
settlement. A person who is worried about governmental power 
may well be suspicious of precedent. A person who is really, 
really worried about governmental power and its tendency to 
corrupt might even question whether there ought to be vertical 
precedent-that is, whether district judges should have to follow 
the Supreme Court's edictsP Again, as a normative matter, 
there is likely to be an optimal level of dispersion of interpreta-
tive authority within a judicial system. Again, that level may be 
somewhere between zero and complete dispersion; it seems 
unlikely to be zero.18 
Finally, as Alexander and Schauer perceptively suggest/9 
concerns about dispersion of power may raise doubts about the 
value of constitutionalism itself. What is constitutionalism, after 
all, if not the concentration of power in a specific group of tem-
porally-situated actors? Does that enterprise not pose the risk 
that really bad decisions could be locked in across a whole coun-
try (and across a whole temporal universe of future countries)? 
If we worry about concentrating interpretative authority in a Su-
preme Court, shouldn't we also worry about concentrating sub-
stantive authority in the Constitution? 
Of course we should. There can be no plausible normative 
case for constitutionalism in the abstract. A constitutional re-
gime might be better than the available alternatives, but that de-
pends on, inter alia, the particulars of the constitution, the struc-
tures that surround and support it, and the range of available 
alternatives. That is why there can never be a normative case for 
the authority of the American Constitution that does not pay se-
rious attention to the substance of what that Constitution pre-
scribes. My narrow point in this essay is only that if there are any 
normative reasons for adhering to the most obvious structural 
features of the American Constitution, those reasons can also 
17. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Theme of 
Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 77-88 (1989). 
18. This is not a statement about the actual regime of precedent prescribed by the 
Conslltutwn. I have rummated about that elsewhere, Gary Lawson, The Constitutional 
Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 23 (1994), and hope to ruminate 
more carefully in the future. 
19. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 6, at457-58. 
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justify the departmentalist interpretative method that is an inte-
gral part of that structure. And if the Constitution's most obvi-
ous structural features are normatively undesirable, it is very 
hard to see why we do not simply remove the word "Constitu-
tion" from the legal vocabulary and start over. 
